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the shifting electoral fortunes of the Green 
Party from 1980 to the present
Alliance ‘90/The Greens have experienced a surge in 
popularity over the last few months: Some pollsters even 
suggest that they lie head to head with the SPD. At the 
federal level, top Green politicians have claimed lea-
dership of the opposition. At the state level, the Greens 
are experiencing sustained success as well. And for the 
first time since their founding in 1980, the party saw 
the first Green Minister-President at the states level in 
Baden-Württemberg and has a chance of seeing a Green 
Governing Mayor elected in the upcoming states elec-
tions of Berlin, respectively.
A number of political analysts have attributed this phe-
nomenon entirely to temporary shifts in the political cli-
mate. They argue that the current weakness of other par-
ties, particularly the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the 
ongoing public discussions of nuclear phase-out and cli-
mate change and the increased levels of citizen participa-
tion in such initiatives as the “Stuttgart 21” protests have 
bolstered support for the Greens. However, this is only 
a temporary development, the current political climate 
does not, in their view, reflect longer-term trends.
In recent discussions, an opposing view has been gai-
ning ground: the idea that Alliance 90/The Greens is 
becoming one of Germany’s major broad-based main-
stream parties.2 According to this view, Green party 
support has increased and remained so resilient over 
the last thirty years that this (former) anti-party move-
ment can now be described as a truly broad-based main-
stream party—which in its early days would have been 
considered very mixed praise given their anti-party his-
tory. This development cannot remain without conse-
quences for the party system as a whole. For one, for-
merly “small” parties such as the Greens now no longer 
2   See Oliver Hoischen, “Wie grün ist das denn?” Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Sonntagszeitung, November 14, 2010, 6.
The Greens have been riding high in the polls for months now. In 
Baden-Württemberg, a stronghold of the Christian-Democratic Party 
(CDU), Winfried Kretschmann became the first Green party candida-
te to be elected Minister-President of any German state. This artic-
le looks beyond the current political climate to analyze longer-term 
trends in Green party support. The data used come from the Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) Study, carried out by DIW Berlin in cooperati-
on with TNS Infratest, Munich. The data are especially well suited to 
the in-depth analysis of party identification for two reasons: First, the 
SOEP has interviewed the same individuals on their party support 
for 27 consecutive years. Second, the SOEP provides a uniquely rich 
set of data on the question of who these Green partisans are—how 
much they earn, what educational qualifications they possess and 
what their occupational status is.
Our results show that the successes of Alliance ‘90/The Greens in 
recent elections are the product of long-term changes in the party’s 
electorate. From the 1980s until today, the Greens have enjoyed the 
over-proportional and uninterrupted support of younger voters. The 
party has also been successful in maintaining voter loyalty even as 
their supporters grow older. Furthermore, the results show that a 
large proportion of individuals who supported the Greens in their 
youth are now high-income earners, civil servants, salaried emplo-
yees and self-employed. Because of this, Alliance ‘90/The Greens 
are now competing with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and 
Free Democratic Party (FDP) to represent the interests of affluent 
middle-class voters.1
1   The Greens’ official name has changed over the course of time. In their founding phase, the terms 
“Green List” or “Alternative List” were frequently used at the local and state levels, and correspondingly, 
the Association of Greens in Hamburg still go by the name “Green-Alternative List.” When the Greens and 
Alliance 90 merged in 1993, they changed their name to Alliance 90/The Greens. For economy of 
language, we primarily use “the Greens” throughout this article in addition to the full official name.
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serve to ensure parliamentary majorities for the CDU 
and SPD; rather, in Germany’s five-party system, these 
parties are claiming a role as equal partners in a range 
of different government coalitions.3 As the Greens con-
tinue expanding their support base, they will also have 
to pay more attention to the diverse interests of their 
growing base of supporters while avoiding the risk of 
renewed infighting.
As Figure 1 shows, the party’s current spike in popula-
rity is not the result of a constant upward trend over the 
last thirty years.4 As early as the 1980s, political com-
mentators were already sounding the death knell for the 
newly founded Green party. Their argument was that the 
Greens were merely the expression of growing fears of 
unemployment among recent college graduates—fears 
that would dissipate as soon as the labor market situa-
3   See also M. Kroh and T. Siedler, “Die Anhänger der ‘Linken’: Rückhalt quer 
durch alle Einkommensschichten.” DIW Wochenbericht 41, 2008.
4   For an overview of the evolution of the Greens and their support base, see 
W. Hulsberg, The German Greens: A social and political profile (London: Verso, 
1988); J. Raschke, Die Grünen. Wie sie wurden was sie sind (Cologne: Bund 
Verlag, 1993); J. Raschke, Die Zukunft der Grünen. So kann man nicht regieren 
(Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 2001); J. W. Falter, M. Klein, Der lange 
Weg der Grünen. Eine Partei zwischen Protest und Regierung (Munich: C. H. 
Beck, 2003).
tion improved.5 Others claimed that the Greens were a 
passing phenomenon in a generation shaped by debates 
on Chernobyl, acid rain and the nuclear arms race. Fu-
ture generations, it was claimed, would have different 
priorities and the Greens would disappear as quickly as 
they had emerged on the scene.
As the figures show, the Greens have frequently found 
themselves teetering on the edge of political ruin. Af-
ter their first elections to the Bundestag in 1983 and 
1987, the Greens missed the five percent threshold in 
19906 and were mired in bitter infighting between the 
fundamentalist (“Fundi”) and realist (“Realo”) factions 
of the party. This dispute over the party’s direction was 
also marked by the departure of numerous high-profi-
le founding members, who either resigned or switched 
to other parties. 
5   W. Bürklin, “Governing left parties frustrating the radical non-established 
left: The rise and inevitable decline of the Greens,” European Sociological 
Review 4, 1987, 161–166.
6   The 5 percent of second votes in 1990 reported in Figure 1 is the total of 
second votes for the Greens and Alliance 90, which at that time were running 
separately.
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The Greens experienced massive declines in popula-
rity during their first term in the federal government 
under the Schröder administration (1998–2002). They 
had succeeded in pushing through a decision to phase 
out the use of nuclear energy—a central principle of the 
Green platform—but had also turned away from their 
pacifist doctrines to support German military engage-
ment in Kosovo and Afghanistan after then-Foreign Mi-
nister Joschka Fischer had committed the party to this 
line. The result was not just fierce ideological debate 
within the party, but also a dramatic loss in support for 
the Greens among the broader population. In 1999, For-
schungsgruppe Wahlen, one of the major public opinion 
research groups in Germany, reported the lowest levels 
of voting intention for the Greens since 1981—just one 
year after the Greens first joined the ruling coalition at 
the federal level (see Politbarometer, Figure 1).
A longer-term examination of the fluctuations in Green 
party support confirms the temporary nature of the cur-
rent spike in popularity, as reflected in the approximate-
ly 20 percent of the population reporting the intention 
to vote for the Greens if elections were held next Sun-
day (see text box above). Support for the Greens was also 
relatively high, at 15 percent, in the mid-1990s. Never-
theless, it is not impossible that these monthly fluctua-
tions in responses to the voting intention question conce-
al a longer-term trend that would justify the Greens’ fu-
ture designation as a broad-based mainstream party. In 
the following, we explore these long-term trends based 
on data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) Study: 
Three indicators have been used here to measure support 
for the Greens in the German population (Figure 1): first, the 
percentage of (second) votes1 for the Greens in Bundestag 
elections between 1980 and 2009 (red dots). Second, the 
percentage of intended votes for the Greens (gray line) sur-
veyed on a monthly basis by  Politbarometer, a major pollster 
in Germany. Third, the percentage of party identifications for 
the Greens (green dots) surveyed on an annual basis by the 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) study.
Long-term party identification (political affiliation) is mea-
sured in the German electoral research with the question: 
“Many people in Germany lean towards one party in the long 
term, even if they occasionally vote for another party. Do you 
lean towards a particular party?” If respondents answer yes, 
they are asked to state which party.2 In contrast to voting 
intention, which gives indications about the current political 
climate, party identification reveals longer-term trends in 
political affiliations.
A common finding in many Western countries is the decreasing 
importance of traditional political affiliations.3 At present, 
1   The German voter has two votes: the first is for a direct candidate and 
the second is for a party list. The proportion of second votes (Zweitstimmen) 
determines the distribution of seats in the Bundestag to the parties, which 
then fill the seats from their electoral lists. 
2   J. Falter, H. Schoen, and C. Caballero, “Dreißig Jahre danach. Zur 
Validierung des Konzepts ‘Parteiidentifikation’ in der Bundesrepublik,” 50 
Jahre Empirische Wahlforschung in Deutschland. Entwicklungen, Befunde, 
Perspektive, Daten, eds. M. Klein, W. Jagodzinski, E. Mochmann, and D. Ohr 
(Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2003), 1-34.
3   Dalton, R. J., and Wattenberg, M. (eds). Parties without partisans. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000.
around 50 percent of respondents to the annual SOEP survey 
state that they have a long-term identification with a parti-
cular party. In the 1980s, this percentage was five to ten 
percentage points higher. This does not mean, however, that 
the other 50 percent of respondents have no party loyalties. 
Many respondents vacillate between political independence 
and stated party preference from one survey to the next. Loo-
king at the SOEP survey results from a longer-term perspective 
(2006–2010), nearly 70 percent of all respondents stated 
party identification at least once. In the period 1984–1988, 
80 percent of all respondents did so.
A unique feature distinguishing the Socio-Economic Panel 
from many other political surveys is that not only registered 
voters are surveyed—that is, individuals above the age of 18 
with German citizenship—but also individuals without German 
citizenship and all household members aged 17 and older. 
All of the results presented in this Weekly Report cover this 
broad group of individuals aged 17 and older in Germany. 
The probability of answering “yes” to the question of whe-
ther one leans toward a particular party “in the long term” 
is initially lower among young people and immigrants but 
rises steadily with increasing experience with the German 
political system.4
4   On the time up to first mention of party preferences in young people, 
see M. Kroh and H. Schoen, “Politisches Engagement,” in Leben in Ost- und 
Westdeutschland: Eine sozialwissenschaftliche Bilanz der deutschen Einheit 
1990-2010, eds. P. Krause and I. Ostner (Campus: 2010). On the time up to 
first mention of party preferences in first-generation immigrants, see M. Kroh 
and I. Tucci, “Parteienbindungen von Migranten: Parteien brauchen 
erleichterte Einbürgerung nicht zu fürchten,” DIW Wochenbericht 47, 2009.
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Here, the focus is not on current political attitudes but 
on longer-term party identifications and on the socio-
demographic changes affecting party support. 
little movement between the parties
SOEP respondents are asked to state whether and to what 
extent they tend to lean toward a particular party con-
sistently from a long-term perspective. This more las-
ting party identification should therefore be clearly di-
stinguished from the current preference for a political 
party as measured with the “Sunday Question” (Sonn-
tagsfrage, see box).
 Most respondents who report lasting party identifica-
tion remain faithful to that party over subsequent sur-
veys (Table 1). Of the estimated 3.2 million supporters of 
Alliance ’90 /The Greens in 2009, around 2.3 million 
supported the same party in the following year. Appro-
ximately 440,000 Greens supporters in 2009 reported 
not (or no longer) to lean toward any particular party in 
2010. The remaining 430,000 supporters of the Greens 
in 2009 had switched to another party by 2010—the lar-
ge majority to the SPD (262,000). The departures of for-
mer Green supporters to other parties were countered by 
more than one million new supporters who had formerly 
reported no political leanings. Further additions to the 
Greens’ supporters between 2009 and 2010 came from 
former supporters of other parties (500,000), the relati-
ve majority of whom were former SPD voters (320,000). 
Overall, Alliance ’90 /The Greens increased their base 
of support between 2009 and 2010 from 3.2 to 4 milli-
on. Shifts in membership between parties and particu-
larly between left and right are rare: 84 percent of the 
Green supporters from 2009 who reported political par-
ty leanings in 2010 still supported the Greens. For com-
parison: The figure was 95 percent for the CDU/CSU, 
90 percent for the SPD, 89 percent for the Left Party 
and 61 percent for the FDP (Table 1).
Since people who report party identification usually 
remain loyal to that party in the longer term and only 
change loyalties for limited periods of time,7 only a small 
portion of the gradual increase in Green party identifi-
cation to currently 13 percent among all those who re-
ported party identifications can be attributed to fluctu-
ating party loyalties (see Figure 1). Figure 2 presents the 
total changes in party identification among respondents 
who switched affiliations between parties from one year 
to the next since 1985. Although the figure does show 
a strong overall shift in party identification from the 
SPD to the Greens, it also reveals that the Greens have 
not gained steadily from the SPD, but have lost many 
supporters to the SPD, particularly in times of politi-
cal crisis (e.g., during the Fundi-Realo conflict and the 
debates on military deployment in the late 1990s). The 
movements of members between the Greens and the 
traditionally middle-class, center-right parties (CDU/
CSU, FDP) and the PDS/Left Party are of significantly 
lower importance in absolute terms (Figure 2). In 2010, 
the Greens gained supporters from the ranks of the SPD 
and FDP, but lost supporters to the Left Party (approxi-
mately 60,000 each, see Table 1).
Demographic change favors growth in 
Greens support
If the increase in support for the Greens cannot be ex-
plained primarily by defections from other parties, a 
plausible alternative explanation is that a steady stream 
of new members from new birth cohorts is providing 
the Greens the stable base of support that characteri-
zes the traditional mainstream parties. It is a well es-
tablished empirical finding that large percentages of 
Greens supporters can be found among teenagers and 
young adults. A frequently discussed result in electoral 
research is that the median age of Greens supporters 
has increased gradually since the 1990s: Whereas the 
7   The high stability in party identification has also been noted in other 
Western countries; see, e.g., D.P. Green and B. Palmquist, “How stable is party 
identification?” Political Behavior 16, 1994, 437–466; D.P. Green, B. Palmquist, 
and E. Schickler, Partisan hearts and minds. Political parties and the social 
identities of voters (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2002); A.S. 
Zuckerman, The social logic of partisanship. (Philadelphia: Temple), 2005; A.S. 
Zuckerman, J. Dasovic, and J. Fitzgerald, Partisan families: the social logic of 
bounded partisanship in Germany and Britain (New York: Cambridge University 
Press), 2007.
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Independent 31 754 2 992 2 624 654 1 146 777 473 40 420
SPD 1 532 6 668 117 46 320 176 95 8 954
CDU/CSU 1 397 171 8 827 115 34 32 114 10 690
FDP 566 47 356 906 71 14 83 2 043
B90/The Greens 436 262 14 8 2 322 80 65 3 187
The Left 242 94 9 0 25 1 418 48 1 836
Other 216 125 177 50 58 9 535 1 170
Total 36 143 10 359 12 124 1 779 3 976 2 506 1 413 68 300
Example: Of the 68.3 million people in Germany over the age of 17, 2.322 million identified with Alliance 
‘90/The Greens in both 2009 and 2010. Of those who stated that they supported the Greens in 2010, 1.146 
million had described themselves as independents in the previous year.
Sources: SOEP; authors’ calculations.
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Greens supporters in the Socio-Economic Panel were 28 
years old on average (median) between 1984 and 1989, 
today they are 42.8
According to a common argument, which also corres-
ponds to the present data from the Socio-Economic Pa-
nel (SOEP), the first generations of young Greens sup-
8   On the debate over the “graying” of the Greens, see W. Bürklin and R.J. 
Dalton, “Das Ergrauen der Grünen,” in Wahlen und Wähler: Analysen aus 
Anlass der Bundestagswahl 1990. eds. H.D. Klingemann and M. Kaase 
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994), 264–302; M. Klein and K. Arzheimer, 
“Grau in Grau. Die Grünen und ihre Wähler nach eineinhalb Jahrzehnten,” 
Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 49, 1997, 650–673; U. 
Kohler, “Zur Attraktivität der Grünen bei älteren Wählern,”. Kölner Zeitschrift 
für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 50, 1998, 536–559; M. Klein, “Die 
Entwicklung der grünen Wählerschaft im Laufe dreier Jahrzehnte- eine 
empirische APK-Analyse,” in Politik—Wissenschaft - Medien. Festschrift für 
Jürgen W. Falter zum 65. Geburtstag. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, eds. H. 
Kaspar, H. Schoen, S. Schumann, and J. W. Winkler (Opaden, 1999); M. Spiess 
and M. Kroh, “A selection model for panel data: the prospects of Green party 
support.” Political Analysis 18, 2010, 172-188.
porters from the 1980s (the 1950/59 and particularly 
the 1960/69 age cohorts) were still faithful to the party 
by and large thirty years after its founding (Table 2). In 
the 1960/69 cohort, the percentage of Greens suppor-
ters was 19 percent when these individuals were aged 
20; when they had reached the age of 40 or older, the 
percentage of Greens was still 16 percent. The figures 
do show a slight decline in party support for the Greens 
over the life course, but the difference between cohorts 
is substantially stronger: Older birth cohorts born up 
to approximately 1950 show a significantly below-ave-
rage level of support for the Greens, whereas support 
in younger birth cohorts (born after 1950) is between 
10 and 19 percent. 
If we adjust for the aforementioned negative life-cycle 
effect in the percentage of Greens supporters among all 
those reporting party identification, we find a constant 
high level of Greens support, at 18 percent, in the birth 
Figure 2
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cohorts of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. To the same ex-
tent as the importance of the pre-1950 birth cohorts re-
lative to the post-1950 cohorts has declined over time, 
the percentage of Greens supporters in the population 
has increased. Demographic change therefore acts as a 
structural advantage for the Greens and has been cru-
cial in enabling the party to approach the 20 percent 
mark in upcoming elections.
from the radical left to the Green 
establishment 
Since the majority of young Greens supporters from the 
1980s have remained faithful to the party as they have 
gotten older, not only the median age of Green party sup-
porters but also their socio-structural status has chan-
ged dramatically over the last three decades.
The affluent Greens
The Green party’s support base is comprised almost ex-
clusively of individuals who completed academic-track 
Gymasium (obtaining the Abitur university entrance 
qualification), with approximately 18 percent of all such 
individuals since 1984 reporting identification with the 
Green party. Among those who completed lower secon-
dary school forms (Volksschule / Hauptschule), support 
for the Greens is low at approximately 3 percent. This re-
lation has not changed since the 1980s (Table 3).
Although many Green party supporters completed their 
education in the 1980s, they still had not started wor-
king at that time: From 1984 to 1989, 26 percent of stu-
dents in post-secondary education or training and only 
5-8 percent of self-employed or employed people and civil 
Table 2





















17–20 19 19 17
21–30 16 17 15 18
31–40 7 12 15 19
41–50 2 5 12 16
51–60 1 2 4 9
61–70 1 1 2 4
71+ 0 1 1 3
Total1 4 4 5 6 7 14 18 18 18
1 Estimated median support for the Greens in cohorts controlling for age effects.
Sources: SOEP; authors’ calculations.
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The Greens have been able to rely on a loyal base of voters from the post-war generation.
servants supported the Greens. Since then, support for 
the Greens in the latter three occupational groups has 
grown steadily, or to be more precise: Supporters of the 
Greens have grown into these occupational groups. 
Today, 20 percent of civil servants and as many as 18 per-
cent of self-employed and employed people are Green 
supporters. Among retired people, other non-employed 
people and blue-collar workers, however, the Greens have 
never had a substantial base of support. The share of 
Green party supporters among the unemployed has in-
deed been declining over the last few decades.
The occupational evolution of Green party supporters 
is also expressed in their income. Between 1984 and 
1989, the Greens experienced their highest relative le-
vel of support in the lowest disposable income quinti-
le—at around 10 percent—and an only average level of 
support—at 6 percent—in the highest quintile. This pic-
ture was reversed in the years that followed. In the peri-
od from 2008 to 2010, the share of Green party suppor-
ters in the lowest quintile of the income distribution was 
average (9 percent). The highest share of support was in 
the highest income quintile (16 percent).
With regard to the socio-structural status of their sup-
porters, the Greens today enjoy their highest level of sup-
port among the affluent, educated middle-class. Their 
success with self-employed people and among indivi-
duals with above-average incomes has undermined the 
prior dominance of the CDU and FDP as sole represen-
tatives of this electorate. The lack of Green party sup-
port among blue-collar workers, the less educated and 
the unemployed suggests that the Greens—despite their 
self-perception as “leftist”—are not competing with the 
SPD or the Left Party for members from the traditional 
working class.
Green party supporters typically live in cities
The traditional base of support for Alliance ’90/The 
Greens is concentrated in cities. Furthermore, the per-
centage of Green party support in the population is in-
creasing much more strongly in urban than in rural 
areas. The Greens’ efforts to promote conservation and 
ecologically oriented agriculture thus appear not to have 
paid off in terms of party identification, at least not in 
the rural electorate.
In the “new” German states of the former GDR, sup-
port for the Greens is also below-average. This East-
West distinction also remains intact when controlling 
for other factors relevant to Green party identification, 
such as occupation, income and education. Individuals 31 DIW Economic Bulletin 3.2011
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with an immigration background differ little from tho-
se without in their support for the Greens. Additional 
analyses show higher than average levels of support for 
the Greens among immigrants from Western countries 
and second-generation immigrants.9
Green party identification higher among women
The Greens introduced a women’s quota at an early sta-
ge in their history and have achieved the highest pro-
portion of women of all of the parliamentary groups in 
the Bundestag at more than 50 percent. This, and their 
clear position on gender equality policy, are plausible re-
asons why the Greens have succeeded in gaining more 
supporters among women than among men in their last 
three decades (Table 3).
Over the party’s history, party strategists came to view 
their identification with a limited number of issues such 
as pacifism, ecology and the phasing out of nuclear ener-
gy as ever more problematic. To appeal to broader seg-
ments of the population, the Green party platform was 
therefore expanded and today covers a wide range of so-
cial and economic issues. With regard to their ecologi-
cal orientation, the Greens’ supporters still differ sig-
nificantly from supporters of other parties: From 1984 
to 1989, support for the Greens was 10 percent among 
people who reported being “very concerned” about the 
environment and just 1 percent among those who repor-
ted being “not concerned at all.” Today, the ratio is 18 
to 8 percent (Table 3). Almost identical distributions of 
party support are manifested in concerns about the im-
pacts of climate change, surveyed in the SOEP study in 
2009 and 2010 (not reported in Table 3). The percentage 
of Greens supporters among those who were “very con-
cerned” about climate change was approximately twice 
as high as among those who were not concerned at all. 
In the 1980s, there was also an above-average percenta-
ge of Greens among those who worried about maintai-
ning peace. In the meantime, however, this difference 
has disappeared. For several years now, the Greens are 
no longer perceived as advocates of pacifism. With their 
approval of troop deployments under the government 
of Gerhard Schröder, the Greens relinquished this role 
to the Left Party.
Since 1984, the SOEP has surveyed respondents regar-
ding their concerns about the overall economic situati-
on, and since 1992 about crime—questions that corre-
spond to “classic” middle-class policy fields of growth 
9   See M. Kroh and I. Tucci, “Parteienbindungen von Migranten: Parteien 
brauchen erleichterte Einbürgerung nicht zu fürchten.” DIW Wochenbericht 47, 
2009. 
Table 3 
Percentage of Green Party supporters by voter characteristics 
between 1984 and 2010
1984–1989 1990–1995 1996–2001 2002–2007 2008–2010
Education
Lower secondary 3 3 3 3 4
Intermediate secondary 6 7 7 7 8
Academic-track secondary 17 17 18 18 20
Occupation
Laborer 5 5 5 5 5
Civil servant 6 9 12 17 20
Self-employed/freelancer 5 10 11 14 18
Employed 8 9 13 14 18
Education/training 26 23 24 19 23
Unemployed 10 10 7 7 7
Economically inactive 5 6 10 11 10
Retired 1 1 1 2 3
Income quintile
1 9 8 8 8 9
2 6 6 7 7 8
3 6 6 7 7 9
4 6 8 8 10 12
5 6 7 9 11 16
Size of municipality
up to 2,000 5 7 7 6 5
2 000–20 000 5 6 6 6 9
20 000–100 000 5 5 7 8 8
100 000–500 000 7 9 10 11 14
500 000+ 9 9 12 14 18
East/West
West 6 7 8 9 12
East 9 6 6 9
Migration background
No 6 6 8 9 11
Yes 9 11 10 9 11
Gender
Male 6 6 7 8 10
Female 6 7 9 10 13
Environment
no/low concerns 1 3 5 6 8





no/low concerns 4 6 8 8 11
strong concerns 9 8 8 10 11
Economic situation 
no/low concerns 6 7 9 11 13
strong concerns 6 6 6 6 7
Crime
no/low concerns 7 12 13 15
strong concerns 5 5 4 4
Total 6 7 8 9 11
All figures are the percentage of Greens supporters among individuals in the respective groups or periods who 
report long-term affiliation with a particular party.
The income quintile figures are based on needs-weighted net household income.
Sources: SOEP; authors’ calculations.
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In the last three decades, the Greens have developed a large base of support among affluent, 
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the traditional middle-class, center-right parties to re-
present the interests of higher-income individuals. The 
aim of gaining recognition across all social classes will 
be a litmus test for the Greens: To earn the designati-
on as a broad-based mainstream party, they will have to 
learn to effectively defend unpopular decisions made in 
government to a broader electorate and thus to prevent 
a gradual decline in support.
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and security. Individuals who express serious concerns 
in these two areas are found increasingly rarely among 
Green party supporters, despite their broader party plat-
form. Green supporters made up only 4 percent of tho-
se who reported concerns about crime and 7 percent of 
those who reported concerns about the economy (Table 
3). Green party supporters therefore tend to be uncon-
cerned about either of these two policy areas. Or to put 
it differently: Individuals who see a need for action in 
these two policy areas seldom seek answers from Alli-
ance ‘90/The Greens.
conclusion
The Greens used to represent a party of well-educated 
and ecologically oriented but rather poorly paid young 
people. In recent years, however, they have succeeded 
in maintaining a base of support among their early sup-
porters and in achieving above-average levels of support 
among first-time and young voters. Today, the Greens 
are the party of middle-aged, environmentally conscious, 
educated and affluent civil servants and self-employed 
people living in urban areas. An almost negligible per-
centage of less-educated, lower-paid and unemployed 
people support the Greens. One can therefore conclu-
de that Greens do not need to give these voters primary 
consideration in designing their labor market and eco-
nomic policies. The rise of the Greens is, according to 
the data from the SOEP longitudinal study, anything 
but a short-term phenomenon; rather, the Greens ap-
pear to have a solid and enduring base among educa-
ted middle-class voters. 
A long-term examination of the SOEP data reveals, along 
with socio-structural changes in the ranks of Green sup-
porters, a decline in the importance of peace as a policy 
issue. There has not been an above-average percentage 
of individuals with strong concerns about peace among 
Green supporters since the late 1990s. The substantial 
increase in support for the Greens among women, on 
the other hand, may indicate a positive response to the 
Greens’ focus on gender equality as a policy priority.
Whereas the Greens focused on a limited number of is-
sues in their founding years, creating an image of them-
selves as a one-issue party, developing a broader base 
of support requires more nuanced political responses. 
At present, the Greens have achieved broader support 
base, but still, their supporters remain relatively ho-
mogeneous with regard to their socio-structural status 
and the issues that matter to them. Direct competition 
for leadership on specific policy issues comes from the 
SPD and Left Party—but only the SPD actually compe-
tes with the Greens for supporters. Interestingly, the 
results show that the Greens are now competing with DIW Economic Bulletin 3.2011
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